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Abstract 
We examine the capacity of human rights commissions to help foster public 
policy change by focusing on the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the role it 
played in advancing sexual orientation equality rights in Canada.  Our case study is 
informed by Commission annual reports, speeches by past Chief Commissioners, 
presentations by the Commission to Parliamentary Committees and an examination of 
442 sexual orientation complaints closed by the Commission by 2005. Our study shows 
that from its inception, the Commission had a simple and consistent message: sexual 
orientation should not be the basis for denying employment, services or benefits to 
individuals.  Using a variety of strategies, the Commission facilitated the incorporation of 
this message into the Canadian Human Rights Act, by promoting the designation of 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.  Subsequently, the 
Commission became actively involved in securing equal access to employment-related 
benefits in the federal sphere for same-sex couples, and also added its voice in support of 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage.   The Commission’s multi-faceted efforts 
demonstrate that it sought to play a role in public policy development on sexual 
orientation equality rights despite a lack of political will or initial public support.  These 
efforts also illustrate the important but often underemphasized role of the statutory human 
rights framework in contributing to the advancement of equality rights in Canada.   
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Introduction 
Since the emergence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a 
series of state-based human rights institutions have emerged to protect and promote 
equality rights.  In Canada, the formalization of equality rights occurred in part through 
the creation of human rights codes and commissions designed to administer and enforce 
the codes.  Provincial codes and human rights commissions were established between 
1962 and 1979, while a federal human rights commission emerged in 1977 with the 
passage of Bill C-25, the Canadian Human Rights Act (hereafter “CHRA”).1 Territorial 
human rights legislation and human rights commissions were developed later in time.2   
The provincial, territorial and federal commissions are closely related in structure 
and mandate.  They are autonomous, state-sponsored institutions that operate in the 
public interest.  Their legal mandate is to protect and promote equality and freedom from 
discrimination on grounds prohibited in their respective human rights legislation.  
Underlying all of their activities is the belief that human rights commissions should 
transform public policy and Canadian society on issues related to human rights.3  
Human rights commissions assume this responsibility by mobilizing a variety of 
strategies, which may include urging the government to introduce more comprehensive 
equality rights legislation, accepting complaints and forwarding important cases to human 
rights tribunals, and gaining intervener status in cases brought before the courts.  
Complementing these strategies are educational campaigns designed to stimulate greater 
rights awareness among citizens.  By publicizing equality rights and the existence of a 
system of rights-based programs and institutions, human rights commissions are seen as 
playing an important role in shaping public demands for a more expansive set of rights.4  
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  In this paper we focus on the federal body, the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission (hereafter “Commission”), to understand its role in stimulating and 
facilitating policy change in the area of equality rights.  We examine this issue by 
focusing on sexual orientation, the most recent prohibited ground of discrimination to be 
added to the CHRA.  Analysis of Commission documents including annual reports, 
speeches by past Chief Commissioners, presentations before parliamentary committees 
and the 442 sexual orientation complaints for which the Commission rendered a final 
decision by December 31, 2005, shows that the Commission used a range of strategies to 
help advance sexual orientation equality rights.  While previous accounts acknowledge 
some of the activities in which the Commission was involved,5 our findings show that the 
Commission was a persistent, long-term advocate for sexual orientation equality rights.  
We begin this paper with an overview of the means by which sexual orientation 
equality rights were realized in Canada.  This is followed by a description of the 
Commission’s activities as the administrative body for the CHRA, and analysis of the role 
the Commission played in facilitating three specific developments: the establishment of 
sexual orientation as an equality right in the CHRA, the provision of employment-related 
benefits for same-sex couples in the federal sector and the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage.  We conclude by discussing how the unique position of this human rights 
commission helped facilitate change in the area of sexual orientation equality rights 
despite prolonged government resistance to the expansion of these rights and an initial 
lack of public support. 
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The Evolution of Sexual Orientation Equality Rights in Canada: An Overview 
The latter decades of the 20th century witnessed profound transformations in the 
treatment of homosexuals in Canada.  Consider the case of Everett Klippert.  In 1965 
Klippert was charged with four counts of gross indecency after disclosing to the RCMP 
that he had engaged in sexual activities with consenting male partners.  Klippert pleaded 
guilty to the charges and was sentenced to three years in prison.  His sentence was later 
extended to indefinite detention after a psychiatrist retained by the prosecution deemed 
Klippert to be a dangerous sex offender.6  Klippert’s 1967 appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada was denied and he remained in prison until July 20, 1971.   
In many respects Klippert was the harbinger of social change.  His controversial 
case sparked public discussion and parliamentary debate, ultimately leading to the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in 1969.7  On July 20, 2005, ironically thirty-four 
years to the day Klippert was released from prison, the Canadian government legalized 
same-sex marriage when Bill C-38: The Civil Marriage Act came into effect.  By this 
time, lesbians and gays had the benefit of comprehensive protection against 
discrimination in employment, accommodation and the provision of services at both the 
federal and provincial levels throughout Canada.  The relatively short timeframe in which 
substantial policy transformation on sexual orientation equality rights occurred in Canada 
is remarkable, especially given the fact that as late as 1995, sexual orientation was still 
not recognized as a prohibited ground of discrimination under federal human rights 
legislation.     
What brought about the transition from a landscape in which homosexuality was 
effectively criminalized to the present scenario of extensive protection of equality rights 
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for lesbians and gays?  While there were a variety of factors at play, the passage of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter “the Charter”) on April 17, 1982 is 
generally seen as a key development that facilitated the advancement of sexual 
orientation equality rights.8  The equality rights guarantee found in section 15(1) of the 
Charter, which came into effect in 1985, has been particularly important in this regard.  
This section states: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
The Charter has served as a powerful instrument through which legislation 
discriminatory towards lesbians and gays has been successfully challenged.9  In the years 
after section 15 came into force, numerous Charter challenges were brought before the 
courts alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation.10 Although submitted by 
individual plaintiffs, a combination of actors supported and facilitated these challenges 
including lesbian and gay advocacy groups,11 trade unions,12 and lesbian and gay 
lawyers.13 The cases focused on issues such as the absence of sexual orientation in 
federal and provincial human rights legislation, spousal benefits for same-sex partners 
and legal definitions of the terms “spouse” and “marriage.” 
The advent of the Charter, however, does not exclusively account for the policy 
transformation that has occurred in Canada in relation to sexual orientation equality 
rights.  At the same time that Charter challenges were being brought to the courts, 
provincial human rights commissions and tribunals were dealing with discrimination 
complaints that arose in the context of housing, employment and the provision of 
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services.  This became possible when legislatures across Canada began adding sexual 
orientation as a proscribed ground of discrimination to provincial human rights codes.  
Québec was the first to add the ground in its Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in 
1977, followed by Ontario in 1986, Manitoba and the Yukon in 1987, Nova Scotia in 
1991, British Columbia and New Brunswick in 1992, Saskatchewan in 1993 and Prince 
Edward Island in 1998.14  In 1995 and 1998, the ground was read into the human rights 
legislation of Newfoundland and Labrador and Alberta respectively.15
Over this same period at the federal level, the Commission was similarly focused 
on the addition of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground under the CHRA, and was 
thereafter engaged in efforts to secure greater access to employment-related benefits for 
same-sex couples.  In the section that follows, we outline the organizational structure and 
function of the Commission, and then examine the strategies employed by the 
Commission in its efforts to transform federal public policy on sexual orientation equality 
rights. 
 
The Canadian Human Rights Commission: Origins and Role 
In 1977, a broad range of personal and social characteristics became protected at 
the federal level with the passage of Bill C-25, the Canadian Human Rights Act.  The 
guiding principle of the CHRA emphasizes the need for respecting and supporting 
equality rights: “all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals 
to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their 
needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, 
without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices… .”16
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The Canadian Human Rights Commission is the administrative body created by 
the CHRA.  Established in 1977, the Commission is an autonomous, non-partisan body 
that operates in the public interest.  Its activities are directed by a Chief Commissioner, a 
Deputy Chief Commissioner and between three to six other members appointed by 
Cabinet.17  To ensure that the Commission and its Commissioners remain independent of 
political influence, the Chief and Deputy Chief Commissioners are appointed for terms of 
up to seven years; Commissioners may only be removed by Cabinet pursuant to a 
Parliamentary vote.18   
The Commission’s mandate is to protect and promote the equality rights of 
Canadians.  For individuals and groups who experience discrimination in employment 
and in the provision of services within federal jurisdiction, the Commission accepts, 
investigates and attempts to resolve formal complaints of discrimination.  Because the 
CHRA’s approach to remedying discrimination is remedial rather than punitive, the 
Commission seeks to ensure that complainants are compensated for lost wages, expenses 
and hurt feelings.  Respondents, on the other hand, are required to repair the harm done 
and take steps to avoid future harm.  These goals are accomplished primarily through 
methods of mediation, conciliation and/or settlement.  The Commission also has the 
power to refer complaints to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (hereafter “Tribunal”) 
for further inquiry.  This quasi-judicial body is separate from and independent of the 
Commission, and its decisions may be enforced by the Federal Court.  While the parties 
to a complaint may seek judicial review of a Tribunal decision, the Federal Court will 
defer if decisions are based on findings of fact, proper procedures have been followed and 
the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction.19
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Apart from processing human rights complaints, the Commission’s activities also 
include conducting research and developing programs to inform the public about their 
rights under the CHRA; monitoring federal programs, policies and legislation that affect 
equality rights of vulnerable groups in Canadian society; and working with federally 
regulated organizations to prevent discriminatory conduct within their environments.  
These activities round out the Commission’s mandate to promote equality rights in 
Canadian society. 
To ensure that its human rights protections are extended to all Canadians, the 
CHRA has a broad scope.  All federal departments, agencies and Crown corporations are 
covered by the Act.  Industries that fall under its purview include banking, transportation 
and communications, and compliance is expected for both public and private sector 
employers in these industries.  Discriminatory practices are prohibited in employment 
and the provision of services based on any of the eleven grounds of discrimination 
currently specified in the CHRA.  These grounds are: race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, age, sex, marital status, family status, disability, conviction for which a 
pardon has been granted and sexual orientation.  
 
Establishing Sexual Orientation as an Equality Right 
The addition of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under 
the CHRA occurred in 1996 – almost two decades after the Commission first asserted that 
sexual orientation should be protected by federal human rights legislation.  The initial 
exclusion of sexual orientation from the legislation was not an oversight.  When Bill C-
25, the proposed CHRA, was debated in the House of Commons and in the Standing 
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Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in 1977, both special interest groups20 and 
individual Members of Parliament drew attention to the absence of sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination.   In the words of Pierre De Bané, a Member of 
Parliament (MP) in this period, it was necessary to expand the grounds included in the 
proposed legislation so that “the provisions in the sexual area …  cover homosexuals who 
are still discriminated against in spite of the fact that we amended the Criminal Code 
several years ago.”21  A second MP, Gordon Fairweather, warned that if sexual 
orientation was not included in the legislation before it was passed, there might not be “a 
second crack” at amending the CHRA once it was in effect; in Fairweather’s view, it was 
important to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground from the inception of the 
Act.22  
While arguments for the inclusion of sexual orientation received multi-party 
support, the government’s position was that only ‘well established’ grounds of 
discrimination were to be initially included in the CHRA.23  Additionally, opposition to 
including sexual orientation came from the armed forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and the Department of External Affairs.  These bodies were concerned that 
homosexual public servants were susceptible to blackmail and therefore posed a threat to 
national security.24  Ultimately, the CHRA came into effect without the ground of sexual 
orientation. 
The Commission advocated for equality for homosexuals from its first days.  
Gordon Mackintosh attributes this “vanguard approach” to Fairweather, who left politics 
to become the first Chief Commissioner of the Commission.  Fairweather, a long-time 
advocate of the rights of marginalized groups, believed that the Commission had to 
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“represent those without a strong voice” in order to demonstrate its commitment to social 
justice.25  Having come to the Commission with a keen awareness of Parliament’s failure 
to include sexual orientation in the CHRA at the time of its enactment, Fairweather 
focused part of the Commission’s immediate efforts on addressing this issue.   
Sexual orientation was one of five “contentious” grounds that the Commission 
recommended be added to the CHRA in its 1979 Annual Report.26  The Commission’s 
position was that sexual orientation was “irrelevant” to issues of suitability for 
employment, job performance, or access to services and that “(w)hatever one’s views are 
on the propriety of certain forms of sexual preference … it must still be acknowledged 
that persons who are denied equality of opportunity on the basis of their sexual 
orientation are being discriminated against.”27  In this way the Commission made it clear 
from the beginning that it neither approved nor disapproved of homosexuality; rather, it 
was simply opposed to discrimination in employment and in the provision of services that 
occurred on the basis of sexual orientation.  This became the Commission’s policy 
position and successive Chief Commissioners carried the message forward (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Chief Commissioners of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
1977-2006 
 
Name Year appointed Term end 
 
Gordon Fairweather 1977 1987 
Maxwell Yalden 1987 1996 
Michelle Falardeau-Ramsay 1997 2001 
Mary Gusella 2002 2006 
 
In its 1980 Annual Report, the Commission addressed bureaucratic concerns 
regarding the national security implications of employing homosexual public servants. 
The Commission noted that employers would be shielded from complaints of 
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discrimination if they could demonstrate that an individual was denied an employment 
opportunity because he or she did not meet a bona fide occupational requirement. While 
the Commission acknowledged the importance of security considerations in certain 
spheres of federal employment, it also maintained “the requirement for a security 
clearance as a condition of employment should not be endowed with, as it were, magical 
or mysterious significance.  This requirement is a bona fide occupational requirement like 
any other.”28  By placing the onus on individual employers to clearly justify their hiring 
decisions, the Commission simultaneously provided a formal rebuttal to bureaucratic 
intervention and furthered its argument for the necessity of adding sexual orientation to 
the list of prohibited grounds in the CHRA. 
While the Commission asserted the necessity of equality rights for lesbians and 
gays early on, Canadian public opinion in this era was not fully supportive.  For example, 
a 1981 survey conducted for the Commission showed that only one-third of Canadians 
believed that specific protections for homosexuals against discrimination should be found 
in a Charter of Rights.29  Nevertheless, because the Commission’s role was envisioned as 
moulding public opinion and stimulating policy change that would benefit Canadian 
society,30 public sentiments did not deter the Commission from recommending the 
necessity of amending the CHRA, which it continued to do in annual reports up to 1991.31   
The Commission also called for the amendment of the Act in its 1985 submission 
to the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (‘Committee’), which was tasked 
with examining the extent to which federal legislation was compatible with the equality 
guarantee in section 15 of the Charter.  In its final report to Parliament, the Committee 
likewise recommended that Parliament amend the CHRA to include sexual orientation, 
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noting that doing so would “open up an expeditious and inexpensive forum for 
conciliation and conflict resolution to those alleging they have suffered discrimination, in 
the federal sector, on the basis of sexual orientation.”32
In 1986, the federal government responded by agreeing to amend the CHRA to 
include sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination.  It took another ten years, 
however, before Parliament amended the CHRA.  During this time, the Commission 
became a vocal critic of government inaction.  In its 1991 Annual Report, for example, 
the Commission vehemently argued that the lack of legislative amendment was now 
inconsistent with prevailing social ideas about human rights and equality in Canada:  
The question of sexual orientation is perhaps the most glaring example of 
legislation lagging behind social realities and the fundamental premise that all 
human beings are equal in their rights.  Whatever one’s personal outlook on these 
matters, it is intolerable to this Commission that adverse treatment in the 
provision of services or in employment on the basis of sexual orientation should 
apparently go unchallenged in federal law.33
For the Commission, the most immediate consequence of the absence of sexual 
orientation from the CHRA was that it was prevented from accepting and processing 
complaints based on this ground.  It is thus significant that the Commission accepted 
complaints from homosexuals who alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation even before this was a proscribed ground in the legislation.  The first 
complaints were accepted in 1986 (see Table 2).  One of these complaints cited 
discrimination on the grounds of ‘sex’ and ‘race’ and involved a complainant alleging 
harassment from coworkers because of his sexual orientation.  Another complaint filed in 
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1986 on the grounds of ‘sex’ and ‘family status’ involved denial of spousal employment 
benefits to a same-sex partner.  
In 1987, another two complaints were accepted on the ground of ‘family status’; 
both challenged policies that denied spousal benefits to same-sex couples.  The 
Commission outlined the logic that guided acceptance of these ‘family status’ complaints 
in its 1991 Annual Report: “it is the Commission’s business to accept human beings as 
we find them, to make certain that they are treated equally, and to ensure that our legal 
and administrative systems do not permit discrimination against persons who happen to 
live together in situations that differ from those of the majority.”34  
Table 2: Sexual Orientation Complaints Lodged with the Commission, by Year of Acceptance* 
 
Year 
accepted 
 
‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05
Number of 
complaints 
3 2 2 14 3 0 22** 68 60 48 60 29 16 26 14 6 26 23 14 5 
 
 
* Due to missing information on one sexual orientation complaint, a total of 441 sexual orientation 
complaints are listed here. 
 
** Complaints accepted prior to 1992 were submitted on the basis of grounds other than “sexual 
orientation” 
 
In 1992, the equality rights of lesbians and gays under the CHRA were decisively 
affirmed as a result of the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Haig v. Canada.35  
The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of section 3(1) of the CHRA, which 
was alleged to be under-inclusive due to its failure to list sexual orientation among the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination.  As an intervener before the Court of Appeal, the 
Commission argued that homosexuals should be afforded equal protection under the 
CHRA and therefore be entitled to file complaints with the Commission based on the 
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ground of sexual orientation.  The Court agreed, declaring the absence of the ground of 
sexual orientation to be a violation of the section 15 equality guarantee of the Charter, 
and ordering that sexual orientation be read into the CHRA with immediate effect.  The 
Court of Appeal’s ruling in Haig, a “turning point” in the pursuit of sexual orientation 
equality rights,36 enabled the Commission to receive complaints immediately based on 
the ground of sexual orientation.   
Following the ruling, the federal government again announced it would add 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground to the CHRA.  Notwithstanding this, the CHRA 
was not amended until nearly four years later.  The Commission’s 1995 Annual Report 
decried government inaction as undermining Canada’s human rights reputation and the 
citizenship rights of lesbians and gays in Canadian society:  
It is an open secret that a large part of the Government’s reticence to proceed with 
amendments to the Act stems from a perception among some critics that the 
inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited type of discrimination would 
amount to special treatment for homosexuals.  Nothing could be further from the 
truth: it is here and now that they are victims of special treatment by being 
excluded from the lawful protections that are extended to other Canadians.  This 
not only undermines Canada’s much vaunted claim to be a leader in human rights, 
it is a failure in moral logic and a near-public repudiation of the rights of many 
law-abiding and tax-paying citizens [emphasis in original].37  
Chief Commissioner Maxwell Yalden followed up these arguments by publicly 
castigating the government for its failure to incorporate sexual orientation as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination despite repeated promises to do so.  In various interviews 
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conducted with the news media in this period, Yalden was adamant that discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation was unjustifiable.  By March 1996, Yalden had this to say: 
“…  the Universal Declaration of the United Nations on Human Rights, and indeed the 
Canadian Human Rights Act, says all human beings are equal in their rights.  All.  That 
doesn’t mean all minus homosexuals.”38   
On April 29, 1996, the federal Minister of Justice introduced Bill C-33 to include 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination covered in the CHRA; Royal 
Assent was granted on June 20.  The addition of sexual orientation formally ratified that 
homosexuals who experienced discrimination in employment and the provision of 
services at the federal level were guaranteed access to a complaint resolution mechanism.  
As a result of the amendment, the CHRA also complemented many provincial human 
rights codes that had already been revised to include sexual orientation as a ground.  In its 
1996 Annual Report, the Commission applauded the fact that the Government of Canada 
had “finally made it one hundred percent clear that it is no longer lawful in the federal 
domain to deny services or opportunities on (the) basis of (sexual orientation).”39  At the 
same time, the Commission observed that other issues affecting the equality rights of 
homosexuals, in particular access to employment-related benefits for same-sex couples, 
remained to be addressed.   
 
Securing Benefits for Same-Sex Couples 
 Once the Commission was able to accept complaints based on sexual orientation 
following the Haig decision, it turned its attention to specific forms of discrimination 
experienced by homosexuals.  The Commission focused on the issue of equal access to 
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employment-related benefits for same-sex couples, an example of what Kathleen Lahey 
calls a “relational right.”40 The lack of equal access to employment-related benefits was a 
concern from the moment the Commission began receiving complaints from 
homosexuals, and in the years between 1992 and 1996, this issue formed the basis of the 
largest proportion of sexual orientation complaints accepted by the Commission (see 
Figure 1).  Filed under section 10 of the CHRA, these complaints concerned a variety of 
policy matters including health and dental coverage, survivor benefits, tax credits and 
family leave.   
Figure 1: Sexual O rientation C om plaints Subm itted under 
Sections 7, 10 and 14 of the CH RA , 1986-2005*
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* Section 7 complaints allege discrimination in employment and services, section 10 complaints allege 
discriminatory practices and section 14 complaints allege harassment. 
 
 Following the multi-faceted strategy used to establish sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground, the Commission employed a variety of approaches to promote equal 
access to benefits for same-sex couples, including formal demands in the annual reports.  
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In its 1992 Annual Report, the Commission called for a non-discriminatory test that 
would ensure that benefits schemes did not exclude homosexual couples based on their 
sexual orientation.  As the Commission stated, “if benefits are to be extended to 
individuals in a stable, interdependent relationship, such benefits should be made 
available to everyone who satisfies the criteria, without regard to the sexual orientation of 
the recipient.”41   
 The Commission reiterated its call for equal access to benefits for same-sex 
couples in every annual report for the next five years.  Additionally, it drew attention to 
the growing dichotomy that was created by the federal government’s continued failure to 
extend employment benefits to same-sex couples even as private sector employers and 
provincial governments across Canada were doing so in increasing numbers.  In its 1994 
Annual Report, the Commission noted the irony of the situation by asking, “… who would 
not be perplexed when conservative financial institutions and newspaper chains move to 
provide same-sex benefits to their employees well before a Government which prides 
itself on its social conscience?”42
 The Commission also sought to mobilize employee organizations, whose 
participation was crucial in lobbying for equal benefits for same-sex couples.43  In a 
presentation to the Professional Institute of the Public Service in 1993, then Deputy Chief 
Commissioner Michelle Falardeau-Ramsay highlighted the ongoing challenges faced by 
gay and lesbian employees in securing employment and other benefits for themselves and 
their partners.  Reminding unions of the importance of their support for employees 
seeking to challenge unfair labour practices, Falardeau-Ramsay urged unions to advocate 
for the equality rights of same-sex couples in collective agreements:  
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Unions have a certain power, and have certain responsibilities to their lesbian and 
gay members…  They have a responsibility to make sure that the language used in 
collective agreements reflects social reality.  Agreements that give benefits only 
to heterosexual employees’ partners do not reflect social reality nor the anti-
discrimination guarantees of the Canadian Human Rights Act.  And unions have a 
responsibility to support employees who challenge discrimination.44
Apart from these efforts, the Commission also advocated equality of treatment in 
the benefits sphere via two other key avenues.  The first was the Commission’s own 
complaints process.  As Table 3 shows, between 1992 and 1996, the Commission referred 
to Tribunal several complaints alleging denial of benefits to same-sex couples.  In other 
complaints from this period, the Commission approved settlements with employers who 
agreed to extend employment-related benefits to same-sex employees and their partners.  
 
Table 3: Complaint Resolution Type for Accepted Section 10 Complaints, 1992-1996
 # % 
No Further Proceedings* 59 47.2 
Referred to Tribunal 12 9.6 
Settlement approved 39 31.2**
 
* This category includes complaints that were withdrawn or abandoned, and complaints in which private 
settlements were negotiated between complainants and respondents. 
 
** Because the Commission also delivered other complaint resolutions in this time period, percentages do 
not add up to 100. 
 
The second avenue was the Commission’s intervention in federal and provincial 
court challenges to various employment-related benefits schemes that were viewed as 
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discriminating against same-sex couples.  The Commission participated in several of 
these cases from an early stage.  One of the first cases dealing with this issue was Canada 
v. Mossop,45 which began as a complaint before the Commission and concerned the 
denial of a request for bereavement leave by a gay public service employee who attended 
the funeral of his partner’s father.  The Commission was actively involved at all levels of 
this case, first as a party before the Tribunal in 1987 and then as the appellant before the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1992.  In this case, which turned on whether the denial of 
benefits amounted to discrimination based on ‘family status’ under the CHRA, the 
Commission argued that the term “family” should be interpreted in a broad and functional 
manner so that the Act's protections would extend to all those who live as a family, 
including same sex couples.  The Commission’s argument ultimately proved unsuccessful 
since, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, sexual orientation rather than family 
status was the real ground of discrimination involved and this was not a prohibited 
ground under the CHRA at the time the bereavement leave was denied.     
The Commission also intervened in Egan v. Canada,46 the first case in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada considered the constitutionality of legislation denying benefits 
based on sexual orientation.  This was a Charter challenge to the spousal allowance 
regime for low-income couples under the Old Age Security Act, where the definition of 
‘spouse’ was restricted to partners of the opposite sex.  In its intervention before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Commission argued that the denial of the spousal 
allowance to otherwise eligible same-sex partners constituted discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  In the decision rendered in 1995, a majority of the Court agreed 
that the denial of the spousal allowance to same-sex partners violated section 15 of the 
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Charter, but the Court ultimately ruled that this was a reasonable limitation on rights in 
conformity with section 1 of the Charter.47   
Another important case in which the Commission was involved was Moore v. 
Canada,48 the first major legal victory for lesbian and gay couples seeking access to 
employment benefits in the federal sector.  Moore began as a series of complaints filed 
with the Commission, alleging that same-sex partners of federal public service employees 
were being denied access to medical and dental benefits under the public service health 
care and dental plans.  The Commission referred these complaints to Tribunal, and also 
appeared before the Tribunal as a party representing the public interest.  In a 1996 
decision, the Tribunal found that the refusal to extend employment benefits to same-sex 
partners amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The federal 
government was ordered to provide medical and dental benefits to same-sex partners of 
its employees. 
The Commission participated again in this matter when the federal government, 
responding to the original Tribunal order in Moore, attempted to set up a separate regime 
for same-sex partners that granted them the same benefits available to common-law 
spouses.  The Commission argued that the “separate but equal” benefits regime was 
discriminatory because it entitled same-sex couples to benefits based on their sexual 
orientation rather than their spousal relationship.  The Tribunal ordered the government to 
provide benefits on an equal basis by interpreting any definition of spouse or spousal 
relationship without reference to the gender or sexual orientation of the persons 
involved.49
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In Rosenberg v. Canada,50 the Commission again appeared as an intervener in 
judicial processes concerning same-sex benefits; at issue was the constitutionality of the 
definition of ‘spouse’ in the Income Tax Act, which was being used by the federal 
government to block the registration of pension plans that granted survivor benefits to 
same-sex partners.  For a number of years prior to its intervention in the Rosenberg case, 
the Commission had highlighted in its annual reports the obstacle presented by the 
definition of ‘spouse’ in the Income Tax Act.  Additionally, in 1994, Chief Commissioner 
Maxwell Yalden wrote to the Ministers of Justice, Finance and National Revenue, 
requesting that tax advantages for pension and employee benefit plans under the Income 
Tax Act be restructured so that they would be equally available to same-sex partners.  
Government action on this issue was finally achieved via the Rosenberg decision, in 
which the Court agreed that the definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act violated the 
Charter.  The government chose not to appeal this decision, thereby removing an 
important stumbling block to ensuring survivor and other benefits to those in a same-sex 
relationship. 
Despite these advances, numerous other federal benefits regimes remained 
inaccessible to same-sex couples and the Commission continued to receive complaints on 
this issue.  It was clear that individual breakthroughs in securing benefits for same-sex 
couples could not compensate for the lack of a comprehensive solution.  In this regard, 
one component of the remedy ordered by the Tribunal in the 1996 Moore decision was 
particularly significant: the government was ordered, “in consultation with and in 
cooperation with the Commission,” to prepare an inventory of all legislation, regulations 
and directives containing definitions of ‘spouse’ that could discriminate against same-sex 
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couples in the provision of employment-related benefits, accompanied by a proposal for 
the elimination of all such discriminatory provisions.51  As late as 1998, however, the 
government was still attempting to resist this order through judicial channels, and had 
only made amendments to specific statutes where it had effectively been forced to do so 
by the courts. 
In its 1998 Annual Report, the Commission criticized the government’s 
“piecemeal approach” to amending federal legislation containing discriminatory barriers 
to the ability of same-sex partners to receive benefits.52 As the Commission pointed out, 
the government’s prolonged inaction in amending all outstanding benefits-related statutes 
that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation was inexplicable, given the clear and 
repeated rulings by courts on the issue.   
In 2000, the federal government introduced Bill C-23, the Modernization of 
Benefits and Obligations Act, which amended 68 federal statutes so as to extend benefits 
and obligations equally to same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.  This omnibus 
legislation was introduced in the wake of the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in M. v. H., in which the Court found that the opposite-sex definition of ‘spouse’ 
in Ontario’s family law legislation violated the Charter.53   Bill C-23 encompassed a 
range of areas including taxation, pension benefits and access to employment insurance, 
and brought federal legislation in line with legislative changes that were already 
underway at the provincial level.54   
The Commission expressed its support for Bill C-23 in its submission before the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in May 2000, with Chief 
Commissioner Michelle Falardeau-Ramsay describing the bill as “a great step forward 
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towards equality for gay men and lesbians in Canada.”55 The Modernization of Benefits 
and Obligations Act came into effect later the same year.  The Commission welcomed the 
comprehensive legislative amendments brought about through this legislation as “both 
practical and symbolic,” adding that the amendments “recognize the equality of same-sex 
couples not only abstractly or theoretically, but in practice through the concrete 
application of our laws.”56
 
Advocating Same-Sex Marriage 
The idea of legally recognizing same-sex unions in Canada arose well before 
same-sex partners were recognized as ‘spouses’ under either federal or provincial law. 
Attempts by same-sex couples to register a civil marriage occurred as early as 1974,57 
and a constitutional challenge to the common-law definition of marriage first occurred in 
1993.58  The movement to have same-sex marriage recognized in Canada gathered 
substantial momentum, however, following the M. v. H. decision and the enactment of 
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act.59   
In the early 1990s, the Commission emphasized that the issue of extending 
employment benefits to same-sex couples was not to be conflated with the idea of 
recognizing same-sex couples as legally married.  In its 1992 Annual Report, the 
Commission stated that “it is not necessary for the purpose of deciding eligibility for 
these sorts of benefits to judge who is or is not ‘married’: it is sufficient to accept that 
same-sex relationships as well as opposite-sex ones may qualify as relationships of 
continuing interdependence, and to that extent there is no reason to discriminate between 
them on the basis of sexual orientation.”60 The Commission reiterated this position in its 
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1995 Annual Report in response to concerns raised in Parliament that extending benefits 
to same-sex couples would be tantamount to redefining the term ‘family’.  As the 
Commission then stated, the idea of granting same-sex benefits “in no way prejudges the 
question of who is or is not ‘married’ or a ‘spouse’; nor does it promote any particular 
lifestyle.”61
Although the issue of same-sex marriage did not directly engage the 
Commission’s mandate,62 the Commission began to adopt a more proactive stance on this 
issue as the final legislative barriers to recognizing federal employment benefits for 
same-sex couples were removed and the notion of legally recognizing same-sex unions 
became an increasingly live topic in Canada.  In 2000, the Commission expressed its 
disagreement with the inclusion of an interpretive provision in Bill C-23 (the proposed 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act), which stated that the contents of the 
legislation did not affect the meaning of marriage, described as “the lawful union of one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”  No such definition of marriage had 
previously been enunciated in Canadian legislation, although this definition existed in the 
common law and Parliament had adopted a motion the previous year affirming a similarly 
worded description.63  In its submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, the Commission argued that Bill C-23 should not contain a 
definition of marriage because this was not germane to legislation dealing with benefits 
and obligations, and it further asserted that any definition of marriage should be the 
subject of national social debate.64 The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
ultimately came into effect with the interpretive provision included. 
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In early 2002, the Law Commission of Canada published Beyond Conjugality, an 
extensive report on interdependent relationships between adults.  The report 
recommended that Parliament and the provincial legislatures remove the legal restrictions 
on marriage by same-sex couples.65  In its 2001 Annual Report, the Commission 
expressed agreement with this recommendation and in the process, made its first formal 
statement in support of same-sex marriage: 
The Commission…  recognizes and respects that for many, marriage is a 
sensitive issue bound with deeply felt religious beliefs and cultural practices.  
It is, nevertheless, also a reality that there are many gay and lesbian Canadians 
living today in long-term committed relationships, caring for each other, and 
raising families together. They are entitled to respect and dignity and should 
be afforded the same recognition in law as opposite-sex couples.66   
In 2003, the Commission filed a submission to the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, which was then conducting nationwide public 
hearings on the issue of legalizing same-sex marriage in Canada.  The Commission 
asserted that the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage was an 
unjustifiable instance of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that was 
contrary to the equality rights protected under both the CHRA and the Charter.  In the 
Commission’s view, this exclusion from access to a key social institution was an affront 
to the dignity of gay and lesbian Canadians, which had highly damaging effects on their 
ability to determine their lives in a crucial sphere: 
For those same-sex couples who wish to marry, without equal access to the 
institution of civil marriage, their ability to celebrate their commitment, provide 
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the kind of stability civil marriage can afford, and live their lives on equal terms is 
undermined.  From the point of view of human rights law, practice and policy, 
homosexuals are being denied a fundamental personal choice because of their 
sexual orientation.67
The Commission’s wide-ranging submission canvassed and responded to a 
number of arguments raised by those opposed to same-sex marriage.  The Commission 
noted that in a secular democracy, the state could not rely on religious arguments to 
justify the restriction of civil marriage to heterosexual persons, just as the state could not 
impose practices on religious groups that would violate their religious freedom.  
Additionally, the Commission expressed its disapproval of proposals to create an 
alternative category of ‘registered domestic partnerships’ that same-sex couples could 
utilize, instead of granting civil marriage rights to these couples.  The Commission 
maintained that this would deny real equality and reinforce the notion that same-sex 
relationships had a lesser status than those of heterosexual couples. 
Beginning in 2001, a series of Charter challenges were launched in British 
Columbia, Québec and Ontario regarding the refusal of marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.68  In keeping with its past practice on sexual orientation equality rights issues, 
the Commission intervened in 2003 and 2004 in two of these important cases: Halpern v. 
Canada69 in Ontario and Catholic Civil Rights League v. Hendricks70 in Québec.  In 
these interventions, the Commission again expressed its view that the restriction of civil 
marriage to heterosexual couples was an unjustifiable violation of Charter equality rights, 
and that same-sex marriage had to be permitted in order to advance the substantive 
equality of lesbians and gays in Canada.  The Commission also emphasised the 
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importance of focusing on the contextual experience of lesbian, gay and bisexual 
Canadians and the effect that the denial of access to civil marriage had for these 
individuals, rather than focusing on the justifications offered in defence of marriage as a 
heterosexual institution. 
Courts in all three provinces ultimately found that the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage violated the equality rights of lesbians and gays under the Charter.  As a result 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Halpern in June 2003, same-sex couples were 
granted the right to marry in Ontario with immediate effect.  Soon afterwards, the federal 
government prepared draft legislation redefining civil marriage as “the lawful union of 
two persons to the exclusion of all others,” and further providing that the legislation 
would not affect “the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform 
marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.”  The government 
referred this legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada for an opinion on its 
constitutionality.   
The Commission intervened in the same-sex marriage reference before the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  In supporting the proposed legislation extending marriage to 
same-sex couples, the Commission noted that this was the only option that would be 
consistent with the imperatives of equality under Canadian human rights law.  It also 
agreed that religious officials could not be required, in violation of their religious 
freedom rights protected by the Charter, to perform any religious marriage that conflicted 
with their religious beliefs and traditions.  The Commission took issue, however, with an 
ambiguity in the proposed legislation that left open the possible interpretation that 
religious officials would be entitled to refuse to perform civil marriages that conflicted 
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with their religious beliefs.  Recalling the principle that services made available to the 
public must be offered in a non-discriminatory fashion, the Commission asserted that 
religious officials who perform civil marriages should not be able to decline to perform a 
same-sex marriage on religious grounds.  At the same time, the Commission suggested 
that any balancing of religious freedom and equality rights under the Charter should be 
resolved on analysis of the facts and rights at stake in each case.   
In its opinion rendered in December 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed 
that the proposed legislation extending marriage rights to same-sex couples was 
consistent with the Charter.  The Court also stated that “absent unique circumstances 
with respect to which [the Court] will not speculate, the guarantee of religious freedom 
in…  the Charter is broad enough to protect religious officials from being compelled by 
the state to perform civil or religious same-sex marriages that are contrary to their 
religious beliefs.”71  
In the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada opinion, the federal government 
introduced Bill C-38: The Civil Marriage Act in Parliament in February 2005.  The bill 
contained a definition of marriage identical to that presented to the Court.  On July 20, 
2005, the bill received Royal Assent and same-sex marriage became legal throughout 
Canada.72  The passage of the Civil Marriage Act marked a significant milestone in the 
process towards comprehensive recognition of sexual orientation equality rights in 
Canada.  
 
Conclusion 
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Human rights commissions occupy a unique space between civil society and the 
state. They are autonomous government bodies designed to challenge and advance public 
policy on equality rights issues, but from a different perspective and using a different 
approach than activist groups and NGOs who play a similar role in society.73  How 
successful are commissions in fulfilling their mandate?  Are they able to help advance 
public policy and transform Canadian society on issues related to equality rights?  These 
questions informed our examination of the role played by the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission in advancing sexual orientation equality rights at the federal level.  Although 
the Commission is considered by many foreign jurisdictions to be a successful model for 
dealing with discrimination,74 its efforts to prevent discrimination by enhancing the 
breadth and scope of equality rights are neither fully documented nor widely understood.   
Using available documents and the 442 sexual orientation complaints closed by 
2005, our data show that from its inception the Commission recognized that lesbians and 
gays encountered discrimination in a variety of policy domains.  To this end, the 
Commission argued that the CHRA should be amended to include sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination.  The amendment of the CHRA enabled the 
Commission to process complaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation and to 
draw public attention to an area of particular concern, the denial of access to 
employment-related benefits for same-sex couples.  The incremental increases in the 
entitlement of same-sex couples to these benefits, and the recognition of same-sex 
partners as ‘spouses’ under federal and provincial legislation, were important precursors 
to the legalization of same-sex marriage in Canada. 
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The Commission mobilized all available channels to facilitate these outcomes.  It 
promoted the necessity of sexual orientation equality rights in its annual reports to 
Parliament and in comments to the media, and it maintained pressure on the government 
in the face of continued inaction and procrastination. It made submissions to 
Parliamentary committees, and sought to inform and engage unions as collaborators in 
the effort to counter discrimination against homosexuals in the employment sphere.  
Utilizing its own complaint process, the Commission accepted sexual orientation 
complaints before this was a prohibited ground in the CHRA.  It sent complaints 
concerning the discriminatory impact of employment benefit policies to Tribunal, and 
participated in both federal and provincial litigation concerning the ability of 
homosexuals to access protection under the CHRA, receive employment-related benefits 
and marry under civil law.  Through all of this the Commission’s message was consistent: 
regardless of one’s personal views, sexual orientation should not be used as the basis for 
denying basic citizenship rights. 
Our account is intended to complement the existing literature on the development 
of sexual orientation equality rights in the Canadian context.  It has been argued 
elsewhere that without the Charter, lesbians and gays in Canada would likely have 
enjoyed only a “patchwork of rights” scattered across federal, provincial and territorial 
jurisdictions.75  The Charter has undeniably played a crucial role in combating state-
driven discrimination based on sexual orientation, and it is indeed evident that the 
Charter has on a number of occasions been the primary catalyst in achieving a more 
expansive interpretation of human rights legislation in this regard.  Notwithstanding this, 
we suggest that the statutory human rights framework in Canada is an important and 
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often underemphasized factor that contributed to the achievement of comprehensive 
sexual orientation equality rights.  At the federal level, the CHRA and the existence of the 
Commission augmented the discourse on sexual orientation equality rights even before 
the Charter came into effect.  Furthermore, as an administrative body that was mandated 
to promote equality, the Commission served as an institutional actor whose work 
complemented that of other key actors including individual litigants and complainants, 
advocacy groups, politicians, trade unions and lawyers.  The Commission’s activities 
added further legitimacy to the issue of realizing substantive equality for lesbians and 
gays, and helped keep this issue alive despite prolonged government inaction.76   
It may be noted that the advances witnessed in the public policy realm correspond 
with increased public support for the extension of equality rights to lesbians and gays.  
Whereas in 1981 only one-third of Canadians supported the view that homosexuals ought 
to be protected from discrimination in a Charter of Rights, two decades later 
approximately three-quarters of Canadians supported the view that homosexuals should 
have equal rights.77 While we do not claim that these changes are directly attributable to 
the activities of the Commission or human rights commissions generally, it may be fairly 
suggested that the statutory human rights framework, as an additional tool to the Charter 
for promoting the message of equality, has played a role in changing societal attitudes on 
what was once considered a “contentious” public policy issue. 
Although the individual circumstances of human rights commissions vary, our 
research suggests that these bodies are uniquely positioned to play an important role in 
advancing public policy in relation to the equality rights of marginalized groups.  The 
Commission’s work in advancing sexual orientation equality rights is notable as a 
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sustained, multi-faceted effort that was undertaken despite the lack of political 
enthusiasm or initial public appetite for the issue being addressed.  Its approach may hold 
promise as a model for other national human rights institutions seeking to advance 
equality rights for sexual minorities or other disadvantaged groups. 
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